Abstract: Climate change is one of the most fundamental challenges of our time. The extraordinary growth of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions in China represents the single greatest obstacle to global climate change efforts in the coming decades. Meanwhile, China suffers from the adverse consequences of climate change. It has been recognized that two factors may increase climate change risks: (a) the increase in GHG emissions, which will increase the frequency and intensity of climate hazards; and (b) the increase of value-at-risk, such as the increased concentration of the world's population and property in vulnerable areas. Therefore, mitigation of climate change risk involves not only human intervention to reduce GHG emissions but also prevention of potential losses caused by climate hazards. Among many solutions to risk mitigation, insurance has received increased attention due to its expertise in risk management and regulatory function in influencing policyholders' behavior. This Article examines the ability of two types of insurance-liability insurance and catastrophe insurance-to regulate and thus help mitigate climate change risks, and considers the potential lessons for China.
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is one of the most fundamental challenges of our time. 1 The controversy about climate change cuts across scientific theory to litigation. Most scientists who contributed to the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") 2014 report believe that global followed the global trend. 10 Floods, heavy rainfall, landslides, and many other climate hazards are likely to increase dramatically in China. 11 The increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophe disasters will no doubt impede the already vulnerable socioeconomic development of China. 12 It has been recognized that two factors may increase climate change risks: (a) the rising GHG emissions, which will increase the frequency and intensity of climate hazards, 13 and (b) the accumulation of value-at-risk, such as the concentration of the world's population and property, in vulnerable areas.
14 Therefore, mitigation of climate change risk involves not only human intervention to reduce GHG emissions but also prevention of potential losses caused by climate hazards. Among the many proposed solutions to risk mitigation, insurance has received increased attention due to its emphasis on risk management and its regulatory function in influencing policyholders' behavior. In other words, insurance could not only compensate the victims of climate hazards but also reduce climate change risks.
This Article examines the ability of two types of insurance-liability insurance and catastrophe insurance-to regulate and thus help mitigate climate change risks, including risks from rising GHG emissions, and considers the lessons for China. Part I examines the connection between climate change and insurance. 15 Part II focuses specifically on the insurability of cli-10 QIN DAHE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES IN CHINA (I): CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES IN CHINA AND THEIR PROJECTIONS 1, 4-9 (2005).
11 " [B] ased on the regression analysis of natural disaster occurrence and average global temperature from 1980 to 2010, the frequency of epidemics, extreme temperature, flood and storm was estimated to increase by 506 times per year if the average global temperature increases by 1°C." Sha Chen et al., Natural Disasters in China: 1900 -2011 , 69 NAT. HAZARDS 1597 , 1598 (2013 . 12 See id. at 1597-98. 14 Value-at-risk refers to the increase in the value, such as asset values, exposed to natural hazards. Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:319 mate-related liability risk and catastrophe risk, respectively. 16 Part III explores why regulation by liability insurance, whose appropriateness relies on the efficiency of tort-based climate change litigation for loss mitigation, is infeasible, especially in China. 17 Finally, Part IV compares the liability insurance model with the catastrophe insurance model and then proposes a catastrophe-insurance-based private-public partnership for China. 18 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE

A. The Impact of Climate Change on the Insurance Industry
Inevitably, climate change does and will continue to affect the insurance industry, whose function is to shield individuals and businesses from risk. 19 The American International Group ("AIG"), Swiss Re, Lloyd's of London, and other leading insurers and reinsurers all identify climate change as a major threat to global risk management. 20 Major types of insurance products have been affected by climate change. The most widely recognized impact is catastrophic property losses caused by extreme weather hazards. 21 The level of economic losses, including damages to buildings, houses, factories, and business interruption, has increased dramatically due to both climate change and an increasing concentration of the world's population in vulnerable areas. 22 For example, in 1992, Hurricane Andrew caused havoc for catastrophe insurers. 23 The total paid claims were $15.5 billion; more than ten insurers went into insolvency. 24 
exposures.
32 Therefore, this Article will mainly discuss mitigation of climate change risks through liability insurance and catastrophe insurance.
B. Why Insurance Could Theoretically Mitigate Climate Change Risks
As a well-known professional risk management mechanism, insurance plays an important role in mitigating both property and liability risks. 33 For example, a 2012 report of the IPCC identified insurance as a risk mitigation tool for extreme weather events. 34 Because they assume both liability and property risks, in theory insurers have the incentives and the capacity to mitigate risks and the resulting losses. 35 Scholars of regulation-by-insurance, also called insurance-as-governance, propose several theoretical explanations for insurance's risk mitigation function. 36 Some scholars assert that, in the modern state, insurers often perform behavior-control functions and create incentives for policyholders to mitigate risks. 37 For example, through insurance rate classification, liability insurers can charge experience-rated premiums and thus induce policyholders to "behave more carefully than they would otherwise." 38 In practice, insurance laws' reluctance to prohibit rate classification based on controllable characteristics supports insurers' behavior-control functions. Some scholars claim that, compared to the state, insurers have the capacity to manage moral hazard because of both superior information and competition. 39 (1996) . By "utilizing the methodologies of indemnification, insurance uses regulatory techniques such as risk-based premiums, deductibles, exclusions, and loss-reduction services, to give policyholders the incentive to reduce risks and invest in prevention measures. 40 Theoretically, risk-based pricing is regarded as the central approach of insurers to risk mitigation. Insurers' premium-setting process gives policyholders the financial incentive to undertake mitigation measures. In theory, the insurance premium is based on the expected overall losses, derived by multiplying loss probability by loss severity. 41 Reducing either the probability or the severity of loss may lower the premium. As long as such reduction cost is lower than the discount of the premium, policyholders would likely undertake mitigation. 42 If the loss probability and loss severity are too high, however, insurers may refuse to underwrite in the first place. 43 What has been explained previously about insurance in general also applies to liability and catastrophe insurance. In the case of liability insurance, which is designed to defend and indemnify insured emitters of GHGs in climate-change-related tort lawsuits, insurers could charge a lower premium for the insured emitter who reduces GHG emissions, or refuse to underwrite that risk if the insured is emitting too much. In the case of catastrophe insurance, which is designed to compensate victims of extreme weather hazards, insurers could, through higher premiums, deter the insured from residing in higher risk areas as compared to lower risk areas. 44 Therefore, theoretically, insurance could help reduce the GHG emissions, reduce value-at-risk, and thus realize the mitigation of climate change risks. While promising in theory, this is not always true in practice. Whether insurance could send these valuable price signals for climate change risk mitigation depends on a number of practical issues. The following discussion will examine how liability insurance and catastrophe insurance function as risk mitigation in practice. 45 
II. INSURABILITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS
Before answering the question of how insurance can function as risk mitigation, as a threshold matter, we need to revisit the issue of whether climate change risks are insurable, which concerns the willingness and affordability of insurance companies to insure climate-related liability and catastrophe risk.
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A. Insurability of Climate Change Liability Risk
People worry that climate change claims might be the "next asbestos" for insurers. Asbestos claims were some of the first mass tort cases to push the boundaries of liability insurance insurability and coverage. 47 Many describe climate change liability risk as an "emerging risk." When insurers initially underwrote climate change risks, they were perhaps not aware of all the potential impacts. But now those risks are perceived as potentially significant, and even possibly the greatest risk to the property/casualty insurance industry. 48 In defining whether climate change liability risks are insurable, the insurance literature identifies certain basic requirements to be considered:
(1) Actuarial estimation requires that the insurers can identify, quantify, and estimate the frequency and severity of risks and the resulting losses. (2) A causal relationship requires that the causes of losses must be directly assignable and allocable to the insured as the subject of liability. (3) Randomness requires that the materialization of the risk must be random, unintended, and unexpected. First, liability insurers may worry that climate change presents uncertainty as to the intensity and the frequency of natural disasters 50 and that increasing litigations could cause substantial financial losses to insurers because insurers' duty to defend 51 is much broader than their duty to indemnify, at least in the United States; however, "neither the size of the risk" nor potential loss estimates have prevented successful insurance operations in the past. 52 Looking "back at insurance history, there are plenty of examples of insurance against [catastrophe] losses that the insurers could not predict in advance . . . ."
53 Examples include commercial satellite insurance and commercial aircraft insurance. These insurance products both involve huge losses, and at the initial stage of underwriting, insurers had no historical data to assess the intensity and the frequency of losses. 54 Even considering that these risks are still smaller than those from climate change, insurance history is full of what people in the insurance trade call assessment insurance.
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Assessment insurance allows insurers to avoid the same budget constraints they used to encounter, and thereby lessens the fear of uncertainty.
56
In addition to some degree of certainty regarding the size of the risk and potential loss, for a claim to be insurable there must be an actual causal re-29 (1985) (analyzing the limits to insurability of a given risk); see also Charpentier, supra note 14, at 91-109; Wang, supra note 30, at 324.
50 "[T]he uncertainty of climate change risk will significantly affect the insurability of liability relating to tort litigation . . . ." Wang, supra note 30, at 325. It is inevitable for liability insurers to pay enormous litigation costs for the insured. See id. at 324-25. 51 In liability insurance policy, "the duty to defend" is an essential part which means that the insurers agreed not only to pay tort judgments against the policyholder but also to defend the lawsuits brought by plaintiffs against the policyholder even if the suit was groundless, false, or fraudulent. In this sense, liability insurance in effect became "litigation insurance. lationship between the greenhouse gases ("GHGs") emitted by the insured and the resulting property damages or bodily injuries. If not, the liability insurer has a strong argument for denying coverage. Causal uncertainty between climate change and the GHG emitters will affect the efficiency of tort-based climate change litigation. 57 It is still a matter of debate whether large GHG emitters-such as fossil fuel companies, power plants, and automobile manufacturers-can be liable for the losses of extreme weather events and sea level rise as the potential tortfeasors. 58 Considering this causal uncertainty, climate change liability risk cannot be considered entirely uninsurable because the probability of an insured loss is lower.
Another obstacle to insurability is that the timing, magnitude, or location of extreme weather events cannot be known precisely in advance, and thus there might be both a demand for such insurance and willingness by insurers to underwrite such risks. The randomness of the climate hazards also means that insureds have no control over the hazard creating such liability risk, which speaks to the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 59 Moral hazard and adverse selection are generally caused by asymmetric information, which exist in the situation where one party has more or better information than the other in the transaction. 60 In cases of climate hazards, however, insureds have no more information than insurers.
Retroactive liability-which refers to the fact that in the interval between the original tort and the claim for damages the standard of care applied by the courts may change-may also endanger the insurability of long-tail risks.
61 Indeed, a state court might require insurers (ex post) to extend coverage or pay out based on retroactive liability, which some jurisdications have adopted for environment liabilities. 62 490-93 (1999) . Simply put, long-tail risk refers to the risks arising out of the latent nature of certain insured events. See Id. 62 "In some cases, legislators explicitly opted for a retroactive liability regime" in the area of environmental liability; "in other cases, judges held that a particular behavior (like dumping toxic waste) was already considered wrongful at the moment when the act happened (e.g., twenty-five years ago) even though it may be doubtful that this actually was the case." See Michael G. emission of GHGs to the dumping of toxic waste. 63 Liability insurers could argue in response, however, that emitting GHGs is not like dumping toxic waste, which was affirmed in a finding of liability by judges in some cases;
64 it was not wrongful at the time of the act of emission and may not justify an action in tort, and thus emitting GHGs may not apply such retroactive case law.
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B. Insurability of Climate Change Catastrophe Risk
Different from liability insurance, catastrophe insurance is a type of first-party insurance that is designed to indemnify the insured for direct losses resulting from a covered peril, the prospective victims being paid by the insurers once a covered event occurs. 66 Climate change risks, such as extreme weather or sea level rise, present significant challenges to catastrophe insurance due to huge losses. 67 Catastrophes are often called "uninsurable risks," and insurers are likely to flee from underwriting them. 68 The insurance literature often identifies three factors defining an uninsurable catastrophe risk:
(1) Ambiguity of risk, also called uncertainty: the inability to identify and quantify probabilities of predicted losses with sufficient precision; (2) Losses and insolvency: concern that the largest possible loss could threaten insurers' solvency; and (3) Appetite: insurers lack the desire to underwrite climate change risks at a price policyholders are willing to pay. Climate change leads to an increase in the uncertainty associated with the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. When there is "too much" uncertainty, the exposure becomes unmeasurable and unquantifiable, and thus uninsurable. Nonetheless, with the steadily growing body of data on catastrophe events and the development of catastrophe models that could help estimate potential damages, natural catastrophe risk is evolving away from a highly uncertain line of business. 70 Further, similar to liability insurance discussed above, catastrophe insurance involves concerns and arguments about the potential magnitude of catastrophe losses. To address the concern of insolvency, outside capital could supplement catastrophe insurers' capacity to cover claims. Reinsurance and insurance-linked securitization, such as catastrophe bonds, 71 could provide additional capital sources to primary insurers. In addition, and as a last resort, the government could also contribute to solving this problem, because the government has a deep credit capacity due to its ability to raise money through tax or issuing government bond far more easily than private insurers or reinsurers. 72 Third, the asymmetric information problem that affects insurers' appetite may not be as severe as presumed. The so-called moral hazard might be minimal because the risk of catastrophic loss is not the private information of the insured. 73 In addition, many insurers cooperate with scientists on pre-dicting climate change risks and thus have the advantage of information. To some extent, it helps insurers lessen moral hazard problem of the insureds.
III. REGULATION BY LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR MITIGATION OF GHG EMISSIONS?
Although liability insurers in theory have the ability to mitigate greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions through regulatory tools, and though it may not be appropriate to declare climate change liability risk "uninsurable," it is unlikely that regulation by liability insurance will function effectively in practice. Through a comparative study of the United Sates and China, this Part explores the possible reasons why, and identifies specific obstacles hindering regulation by liability insurance in China.
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A. Tortious Liability and Liability Insurance Coverage
The rules of tort law and the resulting liability-if any-for climate change risk play a major role in determining whether liability insurance could help mitigate GHG emissions. Any such liability would force GHG emitters to internalize the risk that insurers then regulate and manage. 75 If polluters face no liability for their behavior, there will be no demand for liability insurance in the first place. Thus, the current obstacles for the establishment of tortious liability need to be clearly understood.
Obstacles to Tortious Liability
Causation uncertainty is an important issue in climate change tortious cases, as claimants must show that their damages are caused by defendants' actions. 76 In climate change cases, as in many toxic tort cases, a legally sufficient causal relationship does not exist. Causal uncertainty leads to other legal disputes that include the identification of tortfeasors and the determination of losses. Since everyone may emit some GHGs and contribute in some degree to climate change, climate change victims should determine who is a viable defendant; however, assessing the damages due to climate change and determining the number of losses is extremely hard. 80 For example, GHG emissions that cause damages may have happened many years ago, and this factor may hinder loss assessment. 81 In response to the causal uncertainty issue, some commentators propose using proportional liability theory and market share liability theory to determine whether the emitters should be liable for damages caused by climate change; however, neither provides an adequate solution to this problem.
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With respect to proportional liability, identifying the culpable emitters and the appropriate amount of damages in response to the increased risk of climate-related disasters is still unfeasible in practice. 83 And, in the case of market share liability, determining the accuracy and the scale of the emissions market on a global basis is quite challenging for victims.
Proof of causation is also required by several statutes in China. A vital question for liability insurance coverage is whether the damage was caused by an occurrence. An "occurrence" is typically defined in U.S. liability policies as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." 87 Do GHG emissions constitute an "occurrence"? The answer in AES is no. 88 The court applied the "eight corners rule" and reasoned that "when the insured knows or should have known the consequences of his actions, there is no occurrence." 89 In other words, if the insured was aware of the GHG emissions, and the resulting damage was foreseeable, then there was objective intent based on the perspective of a hypothetical "reasonable" person. 90 The Virginia Supreme 89 The so called "eight corners rule" means the court determines whether the allegations in the underlying complaint come within the coverage provided by the policy by comparing the "four corners" of the underlying complaint with the "four corners" of the policy. See id. 90 Id. at 536.
court declined to adopt the insured's subjective intent standard in assessing "occurrence."
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Chinese law presents similar rules referred to as "indirect intention." Article 27 of the Insurance Act provides: "Where the assured or the insured intentionally causes the occurrence of an insured event, the insurer is entitled to terminate the contract and shall not be liable for indemnity payment of insurance benefits." 92 When the insured does not intend the harm but "knows with substantial certainty that it would occur as a result of his action," that action meets the tort law requirement of "indirect intention." 93 Indirect intention may entitle the insurer to reject the claim since the insured's act does "intentionally" cause damage. 94 There are further issues beyond those raised by AES. For example, the pollution exclusion is not addressed in AES. Whether carbon dioxide is a "pollutant" within Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy's pollution exclusion is hotly contested, 95 although insureds argue that carbon dioxide is an "omnipresent," "odorless and colorless gas," and thus should not be categorized as a pollutant. 96 This argument was challenged in Massachusetts v. EPA. 97 The United States Supreme Court held that GHGs fell within the definition of "air pollutants" in Section 302(g) of the Clean Air Act. 98 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency adheres to this judgment that GHGs are "without a doubt 'physical [and] States, the duty to defend, an essential part of a liability insurance policy, means that the insurers agree not only to pay tort judgments against the policyholder but also to defend the lawsuits brought by plaintiffs against the policyholder even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. 100 Due to the duty to defend, liability insurers in the United States might be forced to become involved in climate change litigations. 101 In China, however, insurance law only specifies the liability insurers' duty to indemnify but "imposes no duty to defend the insureds."
102 Although insurers have the right to participate in an action against the plaintiffs, in practice few insurers participate in the tortious litigation or the settlement. 103 Since insurers aren't bound by a duty to defend, when claimants sue GHG emitters, liability insurers have fewer incentives to become involved in such tortious liability cases, let alone in regulating emitters' behaviors. In other words, they have few incentives to regulate emitters' behaviors because it's less costly for them if the insureds produce more emissions and then if they are sued as a result.
B. Environmental Liability Insurance in China: Obstacles and Lessons
The prospects are not rosy for mitigating GHG emissions in China through liability insurance. Because climate change liability risk is a kind of environmental risk, environmental liability insurance in China is worth analyzing for possible lessons and obstacles. The number of environmental tort liability cases is rapidly increasing in China. 104 Meanwhile, environmental-risk insurance products are becoming increasingly available and strongly promoted by the Chinese government. 105 Even if climate change risk was covered under existing environmental policies, however, it is unlikely that such insurance could provide significant incentives for reduction of GHG emissions. The reasons are as follows.
First, the penetration rate of environmental liability insurance is low. A glance at the environmental insurance market in China reveals three major insurance products covering environmental risks. 106 The first product is a general liability insurance policy that was extended three or four years ago to 100 Stempel, supra note 51, at 235. 101 Id. 102 cover several kinds of pollution risks. 107 A second is environmental liability insurance that mainly covers personal injuries and property damage caused by pollution; Chinese insurers started offering this stand-alone policy after 2007. 108 A third option involves pollution-site liability that provides coverage for damage to third parties as well as remediation costs for polluted sites. 109 Since 2007, eight provinces and cities-Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Shenyang-have been chosen to develop and promote liability insurance to cover various dangerous industrial risks, such as dangerous chemicals, waste treatment, and petrochemicals. 110 The revenue from environmental liability insurance only accounted for 0.015 percent of the total liability insurance revenue in these experimental areas in 2009. 111 Second, coverage obstacles still exist under environmental liability insurance policies, which cover pollution. Pollution is not clearly defined in the general environmental liability insurance policy. 112 Whether GHGs belong among pollutants remains an uncertainty. To avoid potential risk, the insurers may modify the policy language to exclude liability arising from climate change claims against policyholders. Further, the causal uncertainty associated with climate-change-related claims makes it difficult to bring a claim. Finally, the third-party victims still need to prove a causal link between their losses and the insureds' emissions.
As a result of the above debates related to tortious liability rules, liability insurance coverage, and the environmental policies market in China, liability insurance would not be viable and may not be efficient in encouraging the mitigation of current GHG emissions. Government regulation might be the more efficient approach. China's approach to addressing GHG emissions "relies heavily on top-down, command-and-control regulation, built around bureaucratic targets and controls for local officials and state-owned enterprise leaders." 113 Most recently, the Chinese central gov-ernment has made an international commitment to "lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP to 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030" and to start its national emissions trading system in 2017.
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In the future, the government could also establish a climate change compensation fund and require major emitters to bear the responsibility for premiums. 115 The no-fault compensation mechanism of the climate change fund could provide basic compensation for victims and might adopt the polluter-pays principle to encourage emitters to internalize the external cost of GHGs.
116 This scheme might be more viable than a tort-based liability insurance model because it could avoid the obstacles to tortious liability and liability insurance coverage. 117 Because regulation by liability insurance in mitigation of GHG emissions is not viable in China, the following Part discusses regulation by catastrophe insurance and explores how to mitigate the value-at-risk. 
A. The Liability Insurance Versus Catastrophe Insurance Models
Insurance is regarded as a powerful regulatory mechanism in many fields of liability, including automobile accidents, workplace injuries, environmental harms, corporate and securities liability, medical malpractice, defective products, and defamation. 120 In the traditional framework, liability insurance can incentivize potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the harms they create through its capacity to manage moral hazard and other bad acts of the insureds. 121 Thus, it improves the efficiency of risk mitigation. When it comes to climate change risks, as discussed above, however, regulation by liability insurance to mitigate risks faces theoretical and practical obstacles. 122 In contrast with liability insurance that focuses on greenhouse gas ("GHG") emitters, catastrophe insurance, mainly focusing on victims of climate hazards, can conquer causal uncertainty and other tort liability obstacles. With respect to causal uncertainty, the major barrier from tort doctrines would disappear because climate change victims could seek compensation from catastrophe insurers directly without having to establish the liability of the emitters. 123 Catastrophe insurance shifts the causal connection between the emitters' activities and the losses of the victims.
The catastrophe insurer has several regulatory techniques to minimize value-at-risk and protect insureds from climate hazards, among them risk-based pricing, contract design, loss prevention services, and claim management. 124 Risk-based pricing is the most basic technique for creating incentives to reduce risk. 125 Risk-based premiums enable insurers to provide a discount to insureds adopting cost-effective mitigation measures and thus also provide a clear signal to other insureds in the market. 126 By including such elements as deductibles, copayments, coverage amount limit, and exclusions, contract design can also be used to regulate risk both directly and indirectly. The deductible is an example. It can mitigate moral hazard directly because it prevents victims of climate hazards from shielding themselves entirely from loss and thus encourages them to exercise greater vigilance than would be the case without deductibles. 127 Furthermore, catastrophe insurers could provide loss-prevention services such as flood-proofing of buildings or retrofitting of houses against windstorms. 128 With respect to climate change risks, to some extent, insurers have an advantage because catastrophe insurers have worked in tandem with scientists to identify technical and economic parameters of climate change risks and to develop system-wide technologies for loss prevention. 129 Claim management is necessary to control ex post moral hazard of insureds as a result of their inability to change the possibility of a climate hazard despite their ability to mitigate disaster losses. 130 Catastrophe insurers also employ adjusters "to investigate claimed losses, measure them, and negotiate payouts" to provide greater uniformity and predictability. 131 In terms of the catastrophe insurance model, drawbacks may also exist along with the above merits. First, because of the highly correlated nature and potential concentration of losses from extreme weather exposures, insurers' capacity and appetite to cover such losses may not be sufficient. 132 For this reason, at least in U.S. Gulf Coast states, standard homeowners' insurance policies typically exclude losses from floods and also for wind. 133 Even endorsements that add coverage for these events at additional expense are normally unavailable. 134 The second drawback is that potential victims may fail to purchase insurance against low-probability extreme weather disasters because of the observed behavioral anomaly of individuals to underestimate the expected costs of extreme weather hazards and also because of repeated government bailouts. 135 Accordingly, these drawbacks associ-ated with catastrophe insurance would need to be addressed to develop a feasible catastrophe insurance model.
B. Developing a Feasible Catastrophe Insurance-Based Private-Public Partnership for China
Catastrophe risks have never been covered systematically by either private insurance or government insurance in China. For example, only 0.3 percent of total losses were covered by insurance companies in the 2008 Great Wenchuan Earthquake. 136 It was only in 2014 that the central government established the catastrophe insurance program trials in the cities of Shenzhen and Ningbo and the region of Chuxiong where the catastrophe risk would be "shared between the government, insurance and reinsurance firms and individuals." 137 In considering the current insurance market in China, a phased catastrophe insurance-based private-public partnership that marries the merits of both insurance and government in mitigation of value-at-risk might address the problems described above. The nuts and bolts of this partnership are as follows.
First, under such a partnership, the state would require all property insurers to provide catastrophe coverage for residential properties. In doing so, it would be important for the government to avoid interfering with private insurers' actuarially fair pricing. Insurance premiums reflecting risks can provide individuals with accurate signals in cost-effective mitigation measures. 138 This could be difficult because the Chinese government could face political pressure to interfere with insurers' risk classification and risk-based premiums, particularly because risk classification is not always compatible with social solidarity objectives in China that promote equal treatment of all citizens. 139 Nevertheless, even if there are concerns about the affordability of catastrophe insurance, it is better for the government to provide subsidies to lower-income residents, such as through insurance vouchers, than to suppress insurers' incentives to underwrite policies and distort risk signals provided by actuarially-based premiums. Therefore, the gov-ernment should neither create new institutions to supplant private solutions nor suppress premiums of insurance policies. As a Chinese proverb says, "You can't expect the horse to run fast when you don't let it graze." The state cannot expect the insurers to underwrite policyholders' risks if it does not let insurers make profits. Furthermore, that type of rate regulation would undermine this insurance's effectiveness as a risk mitigation device.
Second, recognizing private insurers' reluctance to underwrite catastrophe risks without any meaningful underwriting history, predictive model, or sufficient capacity, the state could provide a government-funded backstop that assumes the risks of any losses above a predetermined threshold, thereby capping private insurers' maximum exposure. This type of cap could promote the initial entry of private insurers. 140 Third, after several years, maybe longer, when private insurers have gained underwriting experience and developed models, this type of government support could be removed. This, however, may be easier said than done. In this respect, the U.S. terrorism coverage program, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ("TRIA"), provides a cautionary lesson. 141 Established after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TRIA has been twice extended for a total of nine years past its original 2005 horizon.
142 This is a good example of why government support is difficult to phase out over time. One possible reason lies that insurers lobby to keep it in place.
Fourth, the state can use its powers of compulsion to bring more residents into the pool, which maximizes risk spreading, in turn maximizing consumer participation in the insurance market and minimizing adverse selection worries. Compulsory insurance is practiced in some countries, such as in the case of the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR) program in France 143 and the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP). 144 An insur- 140 For example, following Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, established to reimburse all insurers for a portion of their losses from catastrophic hurricanes, has proven that a government reinsurance facility can assist catastrophe coverage when insurers are inclined to withdraw from the catastrophe insurance market. See Kunreuther, supra note 132, at 749-50. 141 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12, 15, and 28 of the U.S.C.) 142 TRIA, which is facing yet an additional extension of six more years, shows the practical difficulties in committing to a "temporary" subsidy. See Molk, supra note 41, at 265-77. 143 The CCR, as a mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance model, has existed in France since 1987, has also been recently introduced in Belgium, and is under consideration in other countries. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Michael G. Faure, The Economics of Disaster Relief, 37 L. & POL 'Y 180, 183 (2015) . 144 The TCIP is regarded as one of the best practices of private-public partnerships in an emerging market designed to reduce economic losses from disasters. ance mandate is particularly important in China, given its recent history of a planned economy. 145 The Chinese people still have a strong reliance on government, especially in the aftermath of a catastrophe. Under the Whole-Nation System, 146 the government is committed to bailing victims out after a disaster. According to an empirical study on property and casualty insurance in five Chinese provinces, there is a negative correlation between the amount of government relief and residents' investment in prevention measures such as purchasing insurance. 147 Without a compulsory requirement, residents in China will seldom purchase insurance to transfer casualty risks.
Fifth, the state should give special treatment to low-income individuals currently residing in hazard-prone areas because of equity and affordability issues. 148 For example, the state could provide means-tested vouchers that are a way to maintain risk-based premiums while covering part of the cost of insurance. 149 As a condition for the voucher, the government could then require property owners to invest in mitigation based on their affordability. 150 Sixth, besides intervention into the insurance market, the state could adopt administrative measures or regulations to require residents to take mitigation measures. Such measures or regulations should coordinate with risk-based insurance premiums. For example, the state could update its building code standards and enforce high-wind design provisions for residential housing.
